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Abstract
In October 2008, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and liquidity shortages rocked American
and European markets, causing investors to exit liquid Jamaican-dollar assets. The Bank of
Jamaica (BOJ) feared a “disorderly depreciation” in the Jamaican-dollar (JMD) exchange rate
to the US dollar (BOJ 2009, 44). In response, the BOJ raised required reserve ratios for cash
and other liquid assets, the first increases since 2002. The BOJ raised reserve ratios three
times—in December 2008, January 2009, and February 2009—because the central bank
could not change its requirements by more than 200 basis points per month. The BOJ raised
the requirement for domestic currency assets to restrict the supply of Jamaican dollars
available to trade for foreign currencies. Further, the BOJ said that raising reserve
requirements on the domestic currency would also help to ensure that banks had cash on
hand when depositors withdrew their funds. The cash reserve ratio increase absorbed JMD
4.7 billion (USD 62.6 million) in the fourth quarter of 2008 and JMD 7.2 billion (USD 96
million) in the first quarter of 2009, according to the BOJ.
Keywords: cash reserve ratio, liquid-assets ratio, Global Financial Crisis, Jamaica, reserve
requirements
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Overview
Cross-border remittances, exports, and
tourism connect Jamaica to the United States.
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
these linkages transmitted the subprimeinduced credit crunch to Jamaica. Creditors
revoked Jamaican institutions’ credit lines,
and credit rating agencies downgraded
Jamaican debt, causing margin calls (BOJ
2009). These two forces produced an acute
need for US dollars (and, via similar
mechanisms, British pounds sterling) while
maturing government bonds produced an
ample supply of Jamaican dollars (JMD).
Understanding that such an imbalance would
cause the currency to depreciate, the Bank of
Jamaica (BOJ) increased the reserves it
required depository institutions to hold
against domestic currency liabilities
(Latibeaudiere 2008).

Key Terms

Jamaica’s reserves-management policy was
characterized by two features: separate
requirements for domestic and foreign
currency liabilities, which had been the same
in the decade leading to the crisis; and a
liquid-assets ratio that included both
government securities and cash as eligible
assets (BOJ 1984).

Purpose of Adjusting Reserve Requirement (RR): to
avoid “a disorderly depreciation in the foreign
exchange market” by increasing domestic currency
reserves (BOJ 2009, 44)
Range of RR Ratio
(RRR) Peak-toTrough

9.0%–14.0% (cash);

RRR Increase
Period

December 2008–
February 2009

RRR Decrease
Period

March 2010–July 2010

Legal Authority

Bank of Jamaica Act

Interest/
Remuneration on
Reserves

Unremunerated

Notable Features

Higher reserve requirements
for domestic currency
liabilities to support the
exchange rate

Outcomes

December 2008:
JMD 4.7 billion
(USD 0.07 billion) absorbed

23.0%–28.0% (liquid assets)

January–March 2009:
JMD 7.2 billion
(USD 0.17 billion) absorbed

On November 18, 2008, the BOJ announced
that it would raise reserve requirements
following a legally mandated 15-day notice period. The central bank said it would raise both
the cash reserve ratio and liquid-assets ratio by 500 basis points (bps) over several months,
with the first 200 bps increase coming in December. The BOJ also announced that it would
offer short-term time deposits—its usual monetary policy tool—bearing high interest rates
to further absorb Jamaican-dollar liquidity (BOJ 2008c).
By February 2009, the BOJ had raised reserve requirements by 500 bps for domestic
currency liabilities and 200 bps for foreign currency liabilities (BOJ 1984; BOJ 2010). The
BOJ raised requirements gradually because the Bank of Jamaica Act (1960) limited increases
to 200 bps per month.
Commercial banks typically held reserves above the required levels. Since Jamaica’s 1998–
2000 financial crisis, commercial banks’ liquid-assets holdings almost always totaled more

480

Jamaica

Runkel

than 125% of the requirement and regularly totaled more than 150% of the requirement.
Thus, as the BOJ gradually raised the reserve ratio between November 31, 2008, and January
31, 2009, commercial banks increased their cash reserves from 19% to 22% of liabilities and
their liquid assets from 36% to 37% of liabilities (BOJ 2021). These changes absorbed JMD
4.7 billion (USD 55.5 million)3 in 2008 and JMD 7.2 billion in the first quarter of 2009 (BOJ
2009; BOJ 2010).
Reserve requirements for foreign currency liabilities remained at elevated levels until March
1, 2010, as shown in Figure 1. The BOJ lowered domestic reserve requirements four months
later, but did not return them to pre-GFC levels, settling the cash reserve requirement at 12%
and the liquid-assets requirement at 26% (BOJ 1984).
Figure 1: Cash Reserve and Liquid Asset Ratios Before, During, and After the GFC

Source: BOJ 1984.

Summary Evaluation
As a result of historical holdings of excess reserves, banks were less sensitive to changes in
reserve requirements than those Jamaican banks that held reserves closer to the required
levels. BOJ quarterly reports credited the increase in reserve requirements with arresting
the decline in the JMD-USD exchange rate.

3

Per Yahoo Finance, USD 1 = JMD 72 on December 1, 2008.
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The BOJ estimated that the December 3, 2008, increase in reserve requirements from 9% to
11% contributed to an increase in cash reserves of JMD 4.7 billion, or 27.4% year-over-year
by the end of 2008 (BOJ 2009).
The BOJ estimated that the first quarter 2009 reserve requirement increases—on January 2
and February 6—led to a 4.3% year-over-year increase in domestic currency liquid assets
held by commercial banks at the end of 2009. This increase in cash reserves was partially
offset by a “significant decline” in commercial bank holdings of BOJ securities (see Figure 2).
The BOJ also estimated JMD 7.2 billion was absorbed in 2009 (BOJ 2010).
Figure 2: Domestic Currency Liquid Assets Held by Jamaican Commercial Banks

Source: BOJ 2010.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Bank of Jamaica raised reserve requirements to remove excess
Jamaican dollar liquidity in the banking system and preserve financial stability by
slowing depreciation of the Jamaican currency’s exchange rate against the US
dollar.
In fall 2008, during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), investors sold Jamaican-dollar assets in
favor of foreign currency assets seen as safe stores of value amid uncertainty and following
the downgrades of Jamaican national debt by the three major ratings agencies (BOJ 2010).
The sales of Jamaican-dollar assets created “extraordinary foreign exchange needs” for
Jamaican financial and non-financial businesses (BOJ 2008c). Around the same time, the
maturation of Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) and Government of Jamaica (GOJ) securities yielded
further Jamaican-dollar liquidity to bondholders. The BOJ sought to discourage those
bondholders from swapping Jamaican dollars for foreign currencies, which would have put
further pressure on the value of the Jamaican dollar. To do so, the BOJ raised reserve
requirements for banks’ holdings of Jamaican-dollar assets on three occasions. It is not clear
why the BOJ raised requirements for foreign currency liabilities on one of those occasions.
To see daily exchange rates over time, see Figure 3.
Figure 3: Daily Exchange Rates During the Global Financial Crisis

Sources: Yahoo Finance 2008a; Yahoo Finance 2008b.
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2. Part of a Package: In November 2008, the BOJ announced a 15-day open market
operation to absorb liquidity until the reserve requirement changes took effect.
On November 18, 2008, the BOJ announced that it would offer a special, short-term
certificate of deposit to primary dealers and commercial banks before the reserve
requirement changes took effect. The deposit paid 20.5% per year and absorbed JMD 5
billion before the 15-day notice period ended and higher domestic currency requirements
took effect (BOJ 2008a; Latibeaudiere 2008). The Jamaican dollar fell against the US dollar
by 1.4% the following week (Yahoo Finance 2008b).
The BOJ took three additional measures to bolster the currency before raising reserve
requirements. On October 15, 2008, it began lending US dollars to banks exposed to margin
calls on Government of Jamaica bonds, which all three major ratings agencies downgraded
in fall 2008 (BOJ 2008b; BOJ 2010). The BOJ also noted another direct intervention in the
foreign exchange market—the sale of foreign currency directly to the public sector.
3. Legal Authority: The Bank of Jamaica Act limited the BOJ to a 200-bps increase of
reserve requirements each month.
Sections 28 and 29 of the Bank of Jamaica Act required the BOJ to set, respectively, the cash
reserve and liquid-assets requirements. The act, however, constrained the maximum and
minimum values each requirement could take and the timing of increases in requirements.
The cash reserve requirement could vary from 5% to 25%, while the liquid-assets
requirement could vary from 15% to 50%. The BOJ could not raise the cash requirement by
more than 200 bps per 30 days, and the central bank had to give regulated institutions at
least 15 days’ notice before the increase took effect. For the liquid-assets requirement, the
same notice grace period applied, but increases could be as much as 500 bps per 30 days
(Bank of Jamaica Act 1960).
4. Administration: Banks held their cash reserves at the BOJ; banks reported their
liquid assets each month.
The Banking Act (2004) required that cash reserves remain on deposit at the BOJ. Liquid
assets included funds held off-site; each bank calculated the cash reserve requirement by
averaging its liabilities at the close of each Wednesday. In 2009, one bank failed to comply
with the increased requirements, and the BOJ used a tool not specified in the Bank of Jamaica
Act—a “special monitoring programme”—to resolve the issue (BOJ 2010, 70). Under the
Bank of Jamaica Act (1960), banks that did not report their holdings correctly could be guilty
of an offense resulting in an initial fine of no more than JMD 150,000 and JMD 5,000 per day.
5. Governance: It is not clear how the BOJ changed requirements.
The BOJ was controlled by a board of directors consisting of the governor, the senior deputy
governor, the secretary, and six other directors appointed by the Minister of Finance (MOF).
This board controlled the policy of the BOJ.
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The Bank of Jamaica Act required the BOJ to publish any changes to reserve requirements in
the official government gazette (Bank of Jamaica Act 1960).
6. Communication: The BOJ communicated by press release and conference.
The BOJ issued news releases to announce changes to reserve requirements. The governor
of the BOJ also spoke about the crisis before quarterly monetary policy briefings
(Latibeaudiere 2008).
In the news release for December 2008, the BOJ said that increases in reserve requirements
would “remove” the buildup of liquidity in the banking system and “preserve order in
financial markets” (BOJ 2008c). While the central bank said it intended to increase reserve
requirements by another 3 percentage points in the future, it also characterized increased
reserve requirements as “temporary” (BOJ 2008c).
7. Assets Qualifying as Reserves: The BOJ used cash reserves and a liquid-assets ratio
that also included short-term Government of Jamaica (GOJ) securities.
Banks could satisfy the cash reserve solely with deposits held at the BOJ.
Banks could satisfy the liquid-assets requirement with cash reserves, plus:
•

Legal tender held outside the BOJ

•

Callable loans

•

Government of Jamaica Treasury bills

•

Local registered stock, a government liability4

•

Time deposits at the BOJ

•

Net balances due from other financial institutions, if positive.

Reserve requirements for foreign currency liabilities could be satisfied with assets
denominated in US dollars, Canadian dollars, or British pounds sterling (BOJ 2010). Available
documents did not describe the nature of assets the BOJ allowed.
The MOF, after consulting the BOJ governor, could make other assets eligible for the liquidassets requirement (Banking Act 2004).

Local registered stock were long-term securities issued by the Jamaican government with a remaining period
to maturity of nine months or less. By contrast, Treasury bills were short-term government instruments with
a 90-day maturity. The liquid assets holdings of the commercial banks generally consisted of cash reserves,
Treasury bills, and local registered stock issued by the government (Brown 1991).
4
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8. Reservable Liabilities: Reserve requirements likely covered deposits, borrowed
funds, and the interest accrued and payable on these liabilities.
Reserve requirements likely covered time, demand, and savings deposits; funds borrowed
from other institutions; and the interest accrued and payable on these liabilities (AndersonReid 2011).
9. Computation: The BOJ calculated monthly cash reserve requirements using a fourweek averaging period, then added an additional noncash requirement.
The BOJ’s required reserves consisted of the cash reserve requirement (CRR) and the liquidassets, or non-cash, requirement (LAR). To calculate the CRR required in a given month, the
BOJ used a four-week averaging period that ended on the third Wednesday of the previous
month.5 The LAR was an additional fraction of deposits or other eligible liabilities required
to be held as risk-free liquid assets, typically in the form of bank notes and coins or GOJ or
BOJ securities with maturities less than one year (Tyrell 2008).
10. Eligible Institutions: Depository institutions with less than 40% of their assets in
mortgages were required to meet the new reserve requirements.
Reserve requirements applied to “deposit-taking institutions” with a ratio of residential
mortgage loans to savings deposits of less than 40% (BOJ 2009, 25). These institutions were
commercial banks, governed by the Banking Act (2004); merchant banks; or other nonbanks, all governed by the Financial Institutions Act (2004). Together, these institutions held
79% of Jamaica’s deposits (BOJ 2010). Building societies with a ratio of mortgages to
deposits that met or exceeded 40% held the other 21% of deposits. They paid cash reserve
and liquid-assets requirements of, respectively, 1% and 5% (BOJ 2019). The BOJ did not
revise reserve requirements on building societies during this period.
11. Timing: The BOJ raised reserve requirements during the GFC and after the
Jamaican dollar had begun to depreciate against the US dollar.
Changes to the domestic currency cash reserve and liquid-assets requirements followed the
collapse of Lehman Brothers during the GFC. For Jamaica, the increases followed a large
volume of foreign exchange transactions that pressured the Jamaican dollar (BOJ 2008c). It
is unclear why changes to foreign currency reserve requirements trailed domestic currency
changes.

If the previous month had five Wednesdays, then the averaging period ended on the fourth Wednesday of the
previous month (Tyrell 2008).
5
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12. Changes in Reserve Requirements: The BOJ raised requirements by 500 bps over
three months.
Deposit/Savings/Term Rates
The BOJ did not differentiate between different types of liabilities.
Local/Foreign Currency Rates
On December 3, 2008, the BOJ raised the cash reserve requirement for domestic currency
liabilities from 9% to 11% and the liquid-assets requirement from 23% to 25%; it left the
reserve requirements for foreign currency liabilities unchanged (BOJ 2008c). On January 2,
2009, 30 days later, the BOJ raised the cash reserve requirement for domestic currency
liabilities to 13% and liquid-assets requirement to 27%; it raised the cash reserve
requirement for foreign currency liabilities from 9% to 11% and the liquid-assets
requirement from 23% to 25%. On February 6, 35 days later, the BOJ raised the cash reserve
requirement for domestic currency liabilities to 14% and the liquid-assets requirement to
28%; it left the reserve requirements for foreign currency liabilities unchanged (BOJ 2010).
These changes extended a gap between domestic and foreign currency requirements.
To track reserve requirement changes over time, see Figure 4.
Figure 4: Timeline of Reserve Requirement Changes

Source: BOJ 1984.
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Marginal/Countercyclical Requirement
The BOJ did not have a marginal requirement, though it had the power to institute one (Bank
of Jamaica Act 1960).
13. Changes in Interest/Remuneration: The BOJ continued to not remunerate
reserves throughout the GFC.
The BOJ did not remunerate cash reserves, including excess reserves (Marks 2022).
However, banks could use interest-bearing time deposits at the BOJ to satisfy the liquidassets requirement (see Figure 5) (Banking Act 2004). These accounts were used more in
2008 than after the BOJ raised reserve requirements.
Figure 5: Commercial Banks’ Liquid Holdings
Average of Daily Balances for Each Month
(JMD '000)

35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000

15,000
10,000
5,000
0

Cash Reserve & Current Account

Specified Assets

Sources: Author’s analysis; BOJ 2021.

14. Other Restrictions: The BOJ placed no other requirements on participants.
Documents surveyed did not suggest that the BOJ imposed other requirements.
15. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The BOJ did not counteract their
reserve-requirement increases with other tools.
The BOJ approached increased reserve requirements as part of monetary policy tightening
(BOJ 2009). They did not try to counteract their crisis actions with other tools.
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16. Duration: Foreign currency reserve requirements returned to pre-crisis levels in
2010, while domestic currency reserve requirements settled between their preand mid-crisis levels.
The BOJ did not fix an end date or end conditions on its reserve-requirement increases. It
lowered requirements after many of its other crisis facilities ended (BOJ 2010). In March
2010, it lowered the cash and liquid assets requirements for foreign currency liabilities to
pre-crisis levels. In July 2010, it lowered the domestic reserve requirements to 12% for cash
and 26% for liquid assets, leaving them above pre-GFC levels (BOJ 1984).
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